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What does psychoanalysis tell us about hope? This paper addresses the sense of belief 
one has in the value of the future, with particular reference to the work of Michael 
Balint and D.W. Winnicott. In particular, the author elaborates on Balint’s ‘new 
beginning’ and Winnicott’s ‘moment of hope’ as the theoretical bases for a 
psychoanalysis of hope. The positive evaluation of hope is set out alongside the 
interpretation of hope from the standpoint of narcissistic omnipotence. Hope is 
defined positively, in the first part of the paper, as the doing of a certain kind of 
action, and, in the second part of the paper, the author explores this claim in more 
depth through a close reading of Anne Enright’s novel, The Green Road. The novel is 
presented as a fictional representation (or literary enactment) of the inner future, 
where the protagonist becomes hopeful in the event of waiting. 
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…the pages of the sea 
are a book left open by an absent master 
in the middle of another life – 
I begin here again. 
Derek Walcott: Another Life (1973, Part One, p. 145) 
 
In Weber’s influential reconstruction of European modernity, the ideal of individual 
autonomy is undercut by inauspicious institutional and cultural conditions. The 
negative attitude of Puritanism, directed ostensibly at the scourge of sentimental 
illusion and idolatrous superstition in the religious life, constitutes ‘one of the roots’ 
of our ‘disenchantment’ in the form of ‘disillusioned and pessimistically inclined 
individualism’ (Weber, 1930, p. 105). How does this account measure up to the state 
in which we currently find ourselves? As the culture of value narrows into an 
increasingly virulent opposition between religious fundamentalism and new 
formations of populist reaction, the crisis of the political moment reveals the extent to 
which the question of ‘disenchantment’ has become more and not less urgent under 
the conditions of late modernity. 
 How should one proceed, then, in a cultural context that has elevated 
intolerance to the level of an ideal on the one hand and, on the other, put an end to the 
naïve acknowledgement of the transcendent? Charles Taylor (2007) has taken up this 
question in terms of ‘exclusive humanism’ and the historical conditions of belief. I 
want to raise a different but related question concerning our belief in the value of the 
future. I take it that the task of re-valuation is at once ethical and political, that it 
extends its reach into our moral, social and spiritual lives. Weber persisted, in his 
more positive evaluation of modern culture, with the idea of ‘personality’ and its 
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intrinsic relation to certain fundamental values and meanings. However, given that 
sociology can get us only so far with the evaluation of ourselves, my question is 
whether psychoanalysis has anything more positive to offer. 
 At first glance, things don’t look particularly auspicious. The Freudian 
interpretation is actually part of the problem, to the extent that Freud (1933 
[1932]/1964) turned ‘disenchantment’ to his own advantage by pitting truth-claims 
against wishes as the basis of his scientific worldview (pp. 158-182). We aren’t well 
served by the Freudian epistemology of demystification, which, as Ricoeur (1970) 
points out, is aimed at our wishful impulses and illusions, rather than error or 
immorality (p. 26 et passim). One might be discouraged from pursuing the matter any 
further due to the implicit identification of hope, illusion and wish-fulfilment 
(Wunscherfüllung) in Freudian metapsychology, coupled with the thinly scattered 
references to hope in contemporary psychoanalysis (Mitchell, 1993, p. 261, n4). This, 
I think, would be an overhasty reaction. I believe there are significant gains to be 
made in persisting with the question of what psychoanalysis may be able to tell us 
about hope – understood as the doing of a certain kind of action. In fact, pushing on 
with the question of hope is indicative of what I mean to say about the nature of hope. 
My starting point is that we don’t need yet more psychoanalytical explanations 
of illusion so much as a viable psychoanalysis of hope. While the construction of the 
latter lies well beyond the purview of a single contribution, I mean to advance our 
understanding of hope in terms of three related arguments. Firstly, I argue that the 
object is most vital in its potentiality; that we are enlivened above all by what we hope 
to find in life; and that the object which is yet to be found exceeds anything we might 
find. Secondly, assuming that hope involves intrinsic reference to action, I link the 
vitality of the object in potentia (in posse but not in esse) to the constitutive nature of 
 4 
hope, understood primarily as an act of waiting. Thirdly, I contend that we don’t wait 
simply because we feel hopeful, but rather that we gain in hopefulness because we 
wait. Taken together, these arguments support my basic claim that hope performs a 
commitment to the ‘envisaged future’ (Loewald, 1962/1980, p. 46). 
 Anne Enright’s (2015) novel, The Green Road, provides a powerful fictional 
representation of hope and futurity, precisely where the protagonist becomes hopeful, 
somehow or other, in the event of waiting. On the one hand, the narrative foregrounds 
the theme of hope as a manner of doing something, as well as a problem of inner 
reality. On the other, the novel is structured as a literary enactment of hope in terms of 
leave-taking and homecoming, which, in the context of the European imagination, 
evokes the deeply ingrained Homeric pattern of return and recognition. In the second 
half of the paper, I offer an extended reading of Enright’s novel along these lines. But, 
to begin with, I outline what seems to me a viable framework for thinking about hope 
by drawing on the work of Michael Balint and Donald Winnicott. In what amounts to 
a critical rereading of two pre-eminent figures in the Independent tradition of English 
psychoanalysis, I approach Balint and Winnicott partly through a Derridean lens. 
 
Primary love 
Balint didn’t address the question of hope as such; nonetheless, I think his emphasis 
on what is expected from the object advances our understanding of waiting on two 
counts – first, as an irreducible combination of regression and reclamation; and 
second, as a beginning that does not cease to be one. For Balint (1930/1985), a new 
beginning presupposes ‘a regression to the most primitive form of life’, which, unlike 
a pathological organisation, is useful to the extent that it includes ‘the hope of a new 
opportunity’ (p. 39). The regressed patient relies on an unconscious sense of hope, or 
 5 
an expectation that the object will ‘respond in a manner reminiscent of primary 
substances’ (1968/2003, p. 148). The expectation is excessive, and as such involves 
the reclamation of somatic memories of abundance and ‘primary object-love’. 
 If we take Balint’s ‘new beginning’ to its logical conclusion, we can see that 
the act of hope is implicitly retroactive, as well as explicitly forward-looking. Après-
coup and avant-coup operate in tandem, consciously and unconsciously, as a twofold 
inscription of psychic temporality and intersubjective arousal. On this reading, 
regression opens the inner future, or the future-to-come, in and through the 
reclamation of a pre-ontological gift of love. The idea of the gift is central for Balint 
and Winnicott alike. The retrospective-prospective structure of waiting, without 
which the ‘origin’ would not have been able to take place, structures hopefulness in 
relation to an inaugural gift of love, what Balint calls ‘primary love’. 
 Waiting thus opens the possibility of the impossible in terms of ‘a gift that 
cannot make itself (a) present [un don qui ne peut pas se faire présent]’ (Derrida, 
1992a, p. 29). Everything has to begin again, as if for the first time, on the primordial 
grounds of love and hope. As such, the new beginning operates at the interface of 
primary love and infinite hope – that is, according to ‘the measureless measure 
[mesure sans mesure] of the impossible’ (p. 29). Experienced in the therapeutic 
movement of regression-reclamation as the possibility of the impossible, Balint’s 
‘new beginning’ is another name for time as such (Derrida, 1968/1982, p. 55). 
 Life is ‘continually making this new beginning’ (Balint, 1930/1985, p. 37) by  
looking forward to what is to come and backward to a beginning. The beginning 
carries within it a power of new beginning, which is not a once and for all event, but 
is enacted repeatedly, so that successive generations may participate in what Balint 
called the ‘potential immortality’ of life (p. 38). The latter renders hope infinite with 
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respect to the eternal recurrence of ‘archaic’ object-love: far from eroding the 
foundation of hope, waiting is a way of keeping hope alive, as well as extending its 
reach, on the primordial grounds of love. The opposition of ‘time’ and ‘eternity’ is, 
therefore, undercut by a ‘beginning’ that does not cease to be one. As Balint defined 
it, the new beginning is implied by the beginning, and the ‘essential iterability’ 
(Derrida, 1971/1982, p. 317) of the beginning means that it remains separable from 
itself, an impossible possible manifest as the interminability of hope. 
 
Narcissism and hope 
I think Balint’s notion of a ‘new beginning’ is indispensable for the psychoanalysis of 
hope. Winnicott (1954/1978) developed a comparable line of thinking by 
differentiating an ‘organized regression’ (momentary or long-lasting) from 
‘pathological withdrawal’ (p. 283). Winnicott’s account of ‘the patient’s expectations 
that belong to the need to regress’ (p. 293) confirms Balint’s fundamental insight that 
an organised regression makes a new beginning possible. In light of Mitchell’s (1993) 
comparative reading of Balint and Winnicott on the one hand and, on the other, of the 
American analyst Harold Boris, there seems to be no disagreement on the 
fundamental point that desire is appetitive and urgent in nature, whereas hope is 
essentially possessive and potential. Beyond this point, however, Balint and Winnicott 
part company with Boris in significant and profound ways. 
 The divergence is particularly evident when it comes to thinking about the 
usefulness of hope in human life. Basically, Boris (1976) elaborates a post-Kleinian 
perspective on the ‘fundamental antagonism’ (p. 144) between desire and hope. 
Drawing on Bion and the idea of a pre-conception searching for and coupling with a 
particular realisation, Boris advances the thesis that hope arises from pre-conceptions 
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of how the world ‘should be’ (p. 144). Focusing on what he sees as the inherent 
divergence in human experience between ‘ought’ and ‘is’, Boris argues that hope 
comes into existence as separate from the instinctual drives, upon which it remains a 
fetter. 
 The argument seems valid to me insofar as it addresses what we might call a 
perverse form of optimism, by which I mean a secret wish that nothing will ever come 
of waiting. This is not the same as someone believing that nothing good will come of 
their situation and, therefore, sinking into a passive state of resignation. Rather, 
appropriated for either perverse or self-destructive ends, hope becomes an active form 
of devitalisation, which Green (2005) describes as an activity of ‘negative narcissism’ 
(p. 121). The perverse temptation to love waiting for its own sake, and to identify with 
‘hope’ as a type of devitalised illusion, is evident in Kafka’s story ‘Before the Law’ 
(1919/1978). In this case, the man from the country sits before the gateway to the 
Law, arrested in the narcissism of his own claim. Freud (1930/1961) in turn alerted us 
to the danger of ‘killing off the instincts’ in the narcissistic act of waiting (p. 79). In 
this case, hope sacrifices life for the ‘happiness of quietness’. Similarly, Klein 
(1963/1980) insisted that, while there may be ‘other sources of hopefulness which 
derive from the strength of the ego and from trust in oneself and others, an element of 
omnipotence is always part of it’ (p. 305). 
 Desire takes on any number of guises for those enthralled by the law and, in 
this respect, there is much to be said for the Freudian-Kleinian analysis of destructive 
narcissism and the devitalised uses of hope. I don’t doubt that patients whose lives are 
given to waiting run the risk of turning hope into omnipotent disavowal. Clearly, 
these patients court an extreme idealisation of themselves that is ‘symmetrical with 
that of the hoped-for object’ (Potamianou, 1997, p. 83). As analysts, we will be 
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familiar with the corrosive aspects of postponement in our clinical work. Boris, 
however, tends to identify hope itself with the ceaselessly postponed life. On this 
reckoning, life is brought to a standstill through the ‘glamour’ of narcissism and its 
omnipotent claim on reality. Consequently, the aim of analysis involves the 
augmentation of desire and the revocation of hope. With patients for whom hope is 
reckoned to be the matter, analysis is aimed at calling hope back from its various 
investments and enactments. This involves what Klein (1963/1980) described as ‘a 
diminished capacity for hope’, if not an annulment of the infantile illusion of hope as 
such (p. 304). 
 
The value of defiance 
The concept of negative narcissism is useful in certain cases, but I don’t think it 
provides a comprehensive account of hopeful waiting. As the second of our two main 
sources for the psychoanalysis of hope, Winnicott allows us to link the envisaged 
future with the notion of defiance. I take it that, while defiance may act as a ‘psychic 
refuge’ (Kohon, 2016, p. 25), it doesn’t necessarily involve an organised ‘psychic 
retreat’ (Steiner, 1993). On the contrary, in the case of the deprived child, the value of 
the defiant gesture is evident as an unconscious expression of hope, a hope that holds 
up ‘over a period of time’ (Winnicott, 1954-5/1978, p. 264). We can infer from this 
that the infant has had an experience of goodness prior to the development of the 
depressive position. Accordingly, Winnicott (1963c/1986) viewed depression as an 
achievement of relative dependence, which, not unlike Balint’s beginning, ‘has within 
itself the germ of recovery’ (p. 72). By contrast, Winnicott (1954-5/1978) associated 
‘depressions that are encountered clinically in psychiatry…with depersonalization, or 
hopelessness in respect of object relationships’ (pp. 271-2, emphasis added). 
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 For Winnicott, defiance and depression alike have value and, in my view, their 
positive evaluation may be applied more generally to hope as we know it across the 
normal range of human experience. In this respect, the idea of antisocial symptoms as 
signs of hope was a major theme of the ‘second phase’ of Winnicott’s work from 1945 
to 1959 (Abram, 2008). It wasn’t until his late paper on object-use, however, that he 
formulated a sufficiently coherent account of the spontaneous violence of life – that is, 
with respect to the infant’s early destructive feelings towards his mother. The notion of 
‘destruction’ itself undergoes a re-valuation in Winnicott’s clinical thinking. In order to 
formulate a genuinely comprehensive psychoanalysis of hope, I propose that we bring 
together these two sets of ideas from different periods in Winnicott’s work. 
 The combined perspective of defiance and object-usage will allow us to re-
evaluate the ‘principle of hope’ (Bloch, 1995) as a transcendent principle of life, in 
conjunction with a destructive first principle. Starting with defiance and the moment of 
hope, Winnicott (1963a/1985) describes how hopefulness follows ‘a break in the 
continuity of the environmental provision’ (p. 104). The ‘break’ refers to the way in 
which the primordial sense of possession, the very groundwork of hope, has been 
impinged against. If we think of deprivation in these terms as a separation trauma, things 
are nonetheless hopeful to the extent that the child experiences the pain of deprivation 
against the background of goodness in the earliest relationship. Life comes to a 
standstill not on account of omnipotence and the perversion of optimism, or in terms 
of the devitalised use of hope, but rather between the underlying conviction that 
‘something is available’ and the unconscious assumption that ‘something is missing’. 
Indeed, far from the abrogation of hope and the attendant fantasies of subjective 
omnipotence, Winnicott credits the unconscious assumption of hope in the child’s 
defiant gesture: ‘a manifestation of the antisocial tendency in a child means that there 
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has developed in the child some hopefulness; hope that a way may be found across a 
gap’ (pp. 103-4). 
 What part does the ‘gap’ play in the achievement of defiance? I think we need to 
revise Winnicott’s account in order to allow for the gap as a means of articulating après-
coup and avant-coup. In drawing our attention to the thwarted developmental process 
that lies behind the child’s antisocial behaviour, Winnicott reduces the moment of hope 
to a reactive reach for life. The gap is seen as no more than an obstacle between two 
contrasting manifestations of the object-world – namely, the missing object and the 
available object. Alternatively, I suggest we see the gap as a potential space in its own 
right; in fact, I would go further and claim that, under certain psychic conditions, the 
reach for life takes place in the gap. For me, the gap frames the possibility of hopeful 
waiting, and as such may be seen as a function of the new beginning. Moreover, by 
substituting ‘defiance’ for ‘delinquency’ (Winnicott doesn’t use the word ‘defiance’), we 
shift the emphasis from reactive to active types of waiting. The gap thus becomes 
integral to the act of hope. 
 Essentially, my argument is that the gap provides an opening for the affirmation 
of hope. I shall come back to this at length in my reading of Enright’s novel. Meanwhile, 
the following examples will give us some idea of what is at stake. Beckett (1983), whose 
entire body of work may be seen as an interminable new beginning, retained a sense of 
hope in relation to failure: ‘Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better’ (p. 
7). Beckett nowhere lays claim to the last word; even at the end, so to speak, the work of 
failure takes places within the gap (between times), rather than in spite of it. In Beckett’s 
work, hope remains alongside failure in the interval that simultaneously breaks in upon 
being and holds open the possibility of living on. We are left in no doubt, by this 
incomparably stark body of work, that the possibility of failure remains active 
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throughout – that is, ‘as the trace of an impossibility, at times its memory and always its 
haunting’ (Derrida, 1998/2002, p. 362). While an exegesis of Beckett isn’t our topic 
here, I think his work offers a further resource for a general theory of hope; most 
importantly, as the pre-eminent figure in a tradition of post-war European literature that 
remains bleakly hopeful, Beckett doesn’t confuse hope with the expression of a wish. 
 Similarly, in The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runner, Alan Sillitoe 
(1959/2007) presents the character of Colin Smith as a defiant voice from the margins of 
society. In Sillitoe’s (short) story, Smith, who thinks of himself as ‘the first and last 
man…both at once’ (p. 8; emphasis added), suffers the pain of deprivation, emotional 
and material, through ‘the loneliness of the long-distance runner running across country’ 
(p. 43). Formally irreconcilable, Sillitoe and Beckett are nonetheless centrally concerned 
with the severity of survival, the defiant impulse to overtake the chronic sense of 
withdrawal and isolation with negative passion. In a story backed by the exemplary 
defiance of the Lawrentian imagination, Sillitoe renders the scourging loneliness of 
Smith as a palpable claim on violence as well as hope. The two hours’ long-distance 
running, three mornings a week, that Smith manages to wangle out of his jailers enables 
him to keep alive his primitive feelings of hope on the one hand and, on the other, to 
clarify his thoughts on class war. 
 ‘Losing to win’ is the trivial aspect of Sillitoe’s story, one of the clichés of the 
genre and, no doubt, the reason for its popular success. On the other hand, Smith’s effort 
to make something of himself beyond the superficial esteem of his jailers lies deeper in 
the very rhythm of the narrative. As with Beckett’s oddly defiant figures, Sillitoe’s long-
distance runner writes and thinks in tandem with his breathing. Should we think of 
breathing itself as hopeful? Beckett (1970/1984) distils the rhythmic injunction of 
narrative, typically paring things back to no more than a moment or two of alternating 
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cries and breathing. Sillitoe (1959/2007) describes the same elemental situation, albeit by 
different means. Half-way through his morning run, and sliding down a steep bank 
against ‘a phlegmy bit of sunlight’, Smith experiences a conscious sense of wonder, and, 
I suggest, an unconscious moment of hope in the midst of estrangement and solitude: 
‘It’s the most wonderful minute because there’s not one thought or word or picture of 
anything in my head while I’m down there. I’m empty, as empty as I was before I was 
born’ (p. 19). The hope expressed in this gratuitous moment suggests a need to go back 
and relive a pre-primitive, if not pre-natal sense of emptiness, and thereby to experience 
for the first time an interval, so to speak, before the world began. Together with the 
permeable boundaries of breathing and thinking, the merged acts of running and writing 
(‘scribbling’) provide a kind of self-holding as a defence against the feeling of being 
empty of oneself, rather than in oneself (Balint, 1963/1993). 
 These immemorial feelings of hope, lining an otherwise unbearable inner void, 
are inextricably linked, emotionally and historically, to aggressive impulses and thoughts 
of war: ‘by sending me to Borstal they’ve shown me the knife, and from now on I know 
something I didn’t know before: that it’s a war between me and them’ (Sillitoe, 
1959/2007, p. 16). Sillitoe’s estranged solitary – ‘me’ rather than ‘us’ – cannot lay claim 
to an articulate political stance; the conscienceless violence of defiance doesn’t amount 
to a coherent resistance. Nevertheless, the evocation of the State’s war against its own 
citizens, set out in the literary context of the mid-century English working-class novel, 
takes us beyond anything that Winnicott said about deprivation. Most importantly, the 
pivotal role of the father in these novels sets this post-war culture of value at an 
irrevocable distance from the Winnicottian tradition in English psychoanalysis. In 
Sillitoe’s story, hope announces the availability of pain as suffering through the defiant 
spirit of the teenager’s emasculated father. More than a reaction to the loss of this or that 
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object, the boy inherits this ‘skin and stick’ image of paternal defiance as a violent, 
aggressive response to the deprived life. 
 
The gift of life 
Sillitoe’s (1959/2007) juvenile delinquent embodies the fundamental intuition that 
‘[e]verything’s dead, but good, because it’s dead before coming alive, not dead after 
being alive’ (p. 11). There is a pristine quality to life in this intuition of the not-yet-
conceived (Bloch, 1995) which recalls the image of Blakean innocence, an image of 
primary affection combined with the possibility of potentia (Thompson, 1993, p. 170). 
The combined perspective of affectivity and potentiality (Henry, 1993) allows for two 
further possibilities – first, that deprivation and pain constitute an essential disruption in 
the vital order of things; and second, that hope represents a primordial expectation in the 
reach for life. 
 Winnicott lends weight to this view of life only in his late work. Most 
importantly, the central and original contribution of his paper on object-use, in which he 
set out his final views on destructiveness arising from love, concerns the ‘intermediate 
position’ between object-relating and object-use. There is certainly no doubt here about 
the fecundity of the gap, or the intermediate state of life on the threshold of being. As an 
integral part of inner reality, the endemic violence of the gap is comparable to the work 
of the truest and deepest self in Ted Hughes’ sense. Winnicott couldn’t possibly hope to 
match the scope of Hughes’s re-valuation of violence and his rendering of inwardness. 
The images in Crow, for example, may be seen as expressions of inner violence, but also 
‘metaphors of “breakthrough”’ into self-knowledge (Bate, 2015, p. 291). Nevertheless, 
Winnicott’s (1954-5/1978) account of the destructive element is quite different from 
anything in either Freud or Klein – that is, where the appearance of ruthless cannibalistic 
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attacks on the part of the infant are understood partly in terms of ‘physical behaviour’, 
and partly as ‘a matter of the infant’s own imaginative elaboration of the physical 
function’ (p. 268). 
 In a world alive with violent infantile passions, Winnicott (1971/1974) posits an 
early developmental process in which the infant actually destroys his mother as a real 
external object, rather than a fantasised object of destruction, destroying her sense of 
herself as a good enough mother (p. 90; see also Ogden, 2016, p. 1247). The idea of 
hope is cast in a new light by the formulation of primitive violence and destructiveness 
in these unsparing and vital terms: hopefulness is discernible in its uses, where 
usefulness depends on the destruction-survival of the object (a mother who survives).
 Here, as elsewhere, the comparison between Winnicott and Klein is instructive. 
Among the not infrequent references to hope in her own work, Klein (1952/1980) 
describes it as ‘one of the factors which help the infant to overcome the depressive 
position’ (p. 75, n1). When the depressive position is at its height in the transference, 
according to Klein (1957/1980), the patient’s insight into his or her own envy and 
destructiveness gives rise not only to ‘pain and guilt’, but also to ‘feelings of relief and 
hope’ (p. 196). Klein didn’t intend the positive evaluation of hope to go beyond a certain 
limit; by contrast, Winnicott credits the constitutive nature of hope. He lets us see the 
extent to which the infant becomes hopeful through the hopes his mother has for him, 
even before the beginning. Winnicott (1952/1978) also surprised himself in coming up 
with the thought that ‘there is no such thing as a baby’, going on to clarify that ‘if you 
show me a baby you certainly show me also someone caring for the baby’ (p. 99). 
 It seems to me that, in clarifying his ‘alarm’ at the appearance of this idea, 
Winnicott didn’t work out its more radical implication that ‘there is someone, some 
other’. As such, he left us with more to say about the ‘mother who survives’ (1954-
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5/1978, p. 270), particularly in relation to the formation of hope. The act of hope is tied 
up with the infant’s own ‘gift gesture’, but it also presupposes an act of devotion on the 
mother’s part. Again, Derrida (1992b) allows us to extend the scope of Winnicott’s 
thinking: the ‘singular anachrony’ that characterises the ‘moment of hope’ applies not 
only to the infant, but also to the mother and her indebtedness to the law of the gift (p. 
299). The immemorial somatic traces of hope are interiorised, retrospectively, as a gift. 
As such, the pre-object mother makes available the hopes she had for the child. The gift, 
in this case, isn’t subsumed by the mother’s desire for the father; the realisation of hope 
isn’t confined to an Oedipus-type narrative. On the contrary, the oedipal schema is 
overdetermined by a general economy of indebtedness. An infant who hasn’t been given 
time to begin with, whose mother doesn’t survive the onslaught of ruthless love, has no 
grounds for hope, nor any reliable means of access to the symbolic order. On the other 
hand, where a findable object has been given as a future possibility on the pre-primitive, 
pre-ontological grounds of primary love, the infant’s reach for life is confirmed and he is 
now able to make a gift gesture of his own. The father and mother thus emerge, in 
retrospect, as findable objects. 
 There is something vital at stake in the child’s violent attempt to re-find his 
capacity to find things, and to keep alive rather than diminish his capacity for hope. 
Winnicott supports this fundamental intuition on the grounds that fantasies of subjective 
omnipotence underpin rather than inhibit our sense of reality. The waiting embodied in 
the defiant gesture contains an expectation of goodness that sustains us, but can never 
be satisfied. On these grounds, the child waits for the gift that the archaic, pre-object 
mother made available as primary love. The gift, which has as its first example ‘the 
mother’s arms or the mother’s body’ (Winnicott, 1956/1984, p. 125), announces and 
inaugurates the inner future and its symbolic substrate. Our belief in the future issues 
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from this vital relationship, but the latter doesn’t lay the foundations for a future that will 
one day be present. We cannot realise the end of the future. Wishes may come true, in 
principle at least; but the gift of life exceeds the use that is made of it, and as such there 
will never be a present time of the inner future. Paradoxically, the possibility of the latter 
rests on the radical impossibility of its accomplishment. Once again, the gift of primary 
love ‘makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible’ (Derrida, 1967/1976, p. 
143). 
 
The enactment of hope 
In this section, I want to extend my reflections on hope through a close reading of 
Anne Enright’s (2015) novel The Green Road. The central character in the novel, 
Rosaleen Madigan, enjoys a ‘life full of scraps, some of them beautiful’ (p. 259). For 
the most part, however, we find her suspended in a vague but all-pervasive sense of 
futile expectancy. We might hear in Enright’s phrase an allusion to Wallace Stevens’ 
lines from ‘Peter Quince at the Clavier’: ‘Beauty is momentary in the mind – / The 
fitful tracing of a portal; / But in the flesh it is immortal’. Leaving aside the immediate 
context of the poem, regarding Susanna’s ablutions and the elders’ desires, the stanza 
alerts us to a theme that lies at the heart of Enright’s novel – namely, transience (the 
‘green going’ of evenings as a figure of ageing) and its transcendent possibilities. 
Rosaleen has yet to reach this far within herself. Meanwhile, everything we learn 
about her character points to a secret wish that nothing will come of the waiting to 
which she nonetheless clings. Haunted by a life that she feels has eluded her, 
Rosaleen stands as a resigned witness to the irrevocable breakdown of her family: 
‘The world she grew up in was so different it was hard to believe she was ever in it. 
But she was in it, once. And she was here now’ (p. 146). 
 17 
 Enright’s character is, in many respects, in a hopeless situation, subject to a 
diminished capacity for love as well as a devitalised use of hope. Yet she continues to 
wait and refuses to let go of the thread of life. Crucially, she takes the abandonment of 
her four children into herself and identifies with the severance. At the same time, the 
sense of hopelessness that pervades much of the novel remains entangled with the 
‘hopeless’ love the children feel for their mother: ‘they all loved her now, they were 
hopeless in it’ (p. 243). What does Enright mean by ‘hopeless love’? Essentially, the 
phrase draws our attention to the despair that hangs like a permanent threat over this 
family of strays. No one in the novel is primarily concerned with the balance of love 
and loss, or with the work of mourning. Instead, a basic fault runs beneath the weight 
of grief, deeper and more disturbed than mourning, in Rosaleen’s primordial sense of 
rootlessness. She no longer feels that she belongs to the place where she lives, and her 
sense of homelessness is paralleled by the wanderings, in Ireland and abroad, of her 
disinherited sons and daughters. The reclamation of hope thus depends on the 
sediment of experience deposited in the family memory, but also on the trace 
memories that go back even further, like the secret that Rosaleen’s eldest son, Dan, 
‘had carried inside him; a map of things he had known and lost’ (p. 203). Family 
witness, silent and inchoate as it may be, extends to historical and political witness in 
a family of internal migrants who ‘had no traction in the world, no substance’ (p. 
240). 
 The novel begins in 1980, in County Clare, from which point the self-portrait 
of an Irish family unfolds through Enright’s use of style indirect libre. Here, as 
elsewhere, it is the ordinary madness of everyday life that concerns Enright, a lived 
history at the interface of the domestic and the parochial rendered in impeccable 
realist prose. The children give the impression of a mother who was unable to cathect 
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their lives, whose love for them was deficient above all in lively attention. The novel 
is centrally concerned with this deficiency, with the extent to which the children’s 
lives fragment for want of an attentive maternal presence at the beginning. In the 
course of the novel, an identifiable figure gradually emerges from this scattering of 
vagrant voices. Rosaleen’s eldest son describes his mother as ‘sequestered’ (p. 32). 
Constance, in turn, detests the state of compensatory hope in which her mother ‘never 
did anything’, a blurred state of hope and regret in which this ‘maddening woman’ 
sacrificed the immediate demands of living (p. 251; emphasis in the original). 
Similarly, Emmet believes his mother saw to it that ‘nothing happened’ (p. 212) and, 
as a result, living in their family was like ‘living in a hole in the ground’ (p. 215). 
Most tellingly, the youngest child, Hanna, equates the ‘weirdly empty’ feel of the 
family house with her ‘dead mother’ (p. 32), notwithstanding the fact that Rosaleen is 
still living and breathing. 
 The impression of psychic deadness extends from the children’s perceptions, 
and their variously damaged adult lives, to the cadence of despair that marks their 
mother’s inner narrative voice. Again, it is important that we don’t confuse despair 
with loss, especially concerning Rosaleen’s unlived life: ‘It gave her a pang, just to 
catch the edge of it. An imagined life’ (p. 146). What makes this situation all the more 
intolerable for the ‘dead mother’, but also for her children, is the fact that 
reminiscence – the recurrence of the ‘old style’ (with its echoes of Beckett’s Happy 
Days) – becomes neither a settled lament nor an identifiable work of mourning. It 
isn’t clear where to draw the line between past and present, real and imagined lives, or 
the living and the dead. The blurring of ghosts and voices makes it difficult for the 
reader to identify the manifestly dead in a family house that seems hardly alive. In 
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fact, Hanna, who assumes that their mother is simultaneously dead and alive, goes 
upstairs ‘to tell her dead mother she was home’ (p. 32). 
 Waiting is cast on unreliable ground by the paradox of the ‘dead’ mother; in 
fact, the child finds her mother bedridden, plunged into a state of withdrawal that 
warns of what is to come, an anticipation of the family’s disappearance, silenced by 
mortality and history. Disinheritance is the overdetermined theme of the novel, which 
is played out as a drama of destruction and survival, particularly in the wake of the 
Famine and the history of dispossession. While it isn’t an explicit theme, the fate of 
Northern Catholics after Partition also forms part of the unconscious fabric of the 
narrative. Similarly, the pivotal detail of ‘hungry grass’ recalls the time of the hunger 
strikes in Long Kesh, following the introduction of internment in 1971. I shall come 
back to hunger in a moment. Meanwhile, the various thematic threads, explicit and 
implicit, are pulled together when Rosaleen decides to sell the house, exposing the 
internally uprooted state of the family. 
 The theme of deracination is repeated in the very structure of the novel. 
Overshadowed by the ‘great ruin’ (p.162) of the dead father, the inscription of death 
at ‘the edge’ of perception haunts a work that interrupts itself through the episodic 
nature of the narrative. Moreover, the interruption works its way into the overall 
structure, comprising the journey out, and the journey back. The division of the novel 
along these lines may be seen in terms of the prospective-retrospective structure of 
hope, the twofold movement of destruction and survival. While the coupling of hope 
and exile has becoming a defining feature of our times, ‘coming home’ doesn’t 
necessarily mean surviving. Homeward journeys for many migrant Irish workers are 
made in defeat and shame, as well as ill-health and old age, and there is certainly no 
question here of reparation or a blissful renewal. Nevertheless, I think the articulation 
 20 
of hope and violence, in the name of the inner future, provides a strong reading of the 
novel, even as it involves the tragedy of waiting. 
 Clearly, the movement of the novel – leave-taking and homecoming – isn’t 
confined to the literal facts of family migration, important though this is for placing 
the Madigans in the pattern of economic diaspora. The geographic montage of County 
Clare, New York, Mali and Dublin provides a contemporary backdrop for the deeper 
dislocations of hope and hopelessness that are worked out primarily through the fate 
of the central character, who, on the threshold of old age, fears that nothing connects 
with anything. The larger political realm is articulated by means of a particular 
literary tradition, in which, through recourse to a configuration that Enright (2016, p. 
5) identifies in the work of William Trevor (the pre-eminent contemporary realist in 
Irish fiction), Rosaleen is brought to the point of impossibility. She ‘had been waiting, 
all her life, for something that never happened’ (Enright, 2015, p. 295) and could 
tolerate this abject state no longer. In desperation, she goes walking alone on a 
winter’s night across the Burren, eventually clambering on her hands and knees in the 
dark. 
 The moment of hope, upon which I contend the novel turns, is presented on an 
elemental scale. Rosaleen’s dark night takes shape through the central metaphor of the 
novel, ‘the green road’ of the title that crosses the uplands of the Burren on the west 
coast of Ireland. In addition to the unpaved track, Enright draws the reader’s attention 
to the essential detail of the ‘hungry grass’. The image is in accord with the ethos of 
the novel, and as such plays a pivotal role in affecting the crucial breaking in upon 
Rosaleen’s claustration. It functions as a nodal point, gathering together infantile 
suffering, the act of hope, historical trauma and natural time. The associative chains 
run deep in the Irish imagination: in Irish mythology, ‘hungry grass’ (féar gortach) is 
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the name given to a patch of cursed grass, which, as Rosaleen knows, sometimes 
grows ‘on a grave where no priest came to say prayers’, or else ‘on the threshold of a 
house where all the people died, with no one left to bury them, and the house fell into 
ruin after’ (p. 278). In the association with a corpse that hasn’t been given absolution, 
the curse condemns anyone who walks on the grass to a permanent and insatiable 
state of hunger. 
 Further to the myth, this ‘hunger’ is rooted historically and politically in the 
collective memory; in particular, the myth of ‘hungry grass’ has become associated 
with the Famine of 1845-1852. A sobering sight, as anyone who has been in this part 
of the world will testify, Famine houses – stone cottages deserted during the Famine – 
can be found everywhere in the west of Ireland. Rosaleen, during her dark night, finds 
herself before such a haunted, dispossessed place – indeed, with hungry grass in front 
of the ruined doorway. Her reckoning is articulated against this historical background, 
a scene which also alludes to Wordsworth’s ‘poor hut / Sunk to decay’ in ‘The Ruined 
Cottage’ (1799/2014, pp. 935-6). Indeed, Enright is no less indebted than Seamus 
Heaney to the dominant English poetic tradition of Wordsworth. Thus, in a further 
association that allegorises the dilemma of Irish literature in English, the infant’s 
hunger pains may be seen as the prototype of the blank pain of despair. A stark 
decision presents itself to Rosaleen, who would no longer be exposed to the elements 
once she was across the hungry grass; and yet, according to the curse, after crossing 
the grass, she would remain hungry forever. 
 Handed down to the children’s ‘dead mother’ by an irreducible complication 
of family, history, myth and memory, the curse brings the question of the future 
sharply into focus. The liberty of myth cannot be fended off at the heart of the family, 
nor simply replaced by historical time. But while history isn’t the only outcome at 
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stake, unburdening herself of the supernatural powers of the curse is nonetheless the 
trial that faces Rosaleen now that she is on ‘the green road’. In the event, she crosses 
the threshold of the ruined cottage; she steps back into the historical past of Irish 
graves and, at the same time, undoes the knots of superstition and confinement, even 
as she confronts the authority of the dead father. She doesn’t cross over into a 
changed world so much as reenvisage the future through a different sense of the past. 
 The metaphor of ‘the green road’ locates the decisive action of the novel on 
the threshold, or in the gap, which is where things remain at the end. Meanwhile, 
Enright roots the transition in the individual immediacies of Rosaleen’s life: the step 
back allows her to put the feelings of despair behind her and to lay her husband’s 
ghost to rest (‘There was no such thing as hungry grass. And Pat Madigan was long 
dead’) (p. 280). Hopelessness is revealed here as a kind of blank pain; crawling along 
the unpaved track on all fours, Rosaleen had put the question to herself of what 
happens when the person you love is gone: ‘A part of his body inside your own 
body…What happened when all that was in the earth, deep down in the cemetery 
clay? Nothing happened. That is what happened’ (p. 266). 
 The step back constitutes a re-valuation of the value of the future, which 
bestows new meaning on the phrase ‘nothing happened’. Compounded by the 
children’s symptomatic complaint that their mother saw to it that nothing happened, 
Rosaleen’s disavowal of grief may be seen as the re-enactment of a defence against 
the archaic pains of hunger, or the infantile want of love. Paradoxically, the silence of 
the grave gives word to a yet more primordial dispossession that threatens to cast 
Rosaleen and her children outside of their own history. The re-configuration of 
national and cross-channel relationships in Ireland, from the 1980s onwards, is the 
more immediate background against which Enright describes the family’s experience 
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of being uprooted and culturally eliminated. Furthermore, the novel shows how the 
deep-seated disinheritance had been split off in Rosaleen through a chronic lack of 
attention, resulting in a profound state of depersonalisation that is revealed by an 
allusion to Macbeth’s ‘borrowed robes’ (Shakespeare, 1987a, p. 1311): ‘It was as 
though she was wearing someone else’s coat, one that was the same as hers…but it 
wasn’t her coat, she could tell it wasn’t. It just looked the same’ (p. 165). 
 Living all along in the ‘wrong house’ (p.165), Rosaleen had found nothing in 
the pattern of her life, nothing that she could rely on in a meaningful way. The 
impersonation provides a cover for the desolation, until she wakes finally, with a start, 
to the sound of laboured breathing. She hears a cow eating ‘mouthfuls of midnight 
grass’ (p. 280) outside the cottage, the sound of which proves essentially hopeful in 
restoring the lapse of time and calling the old woman back to the unfolding of human 
temporality. Enright places the temporal restoration with characteristic precision. 
Historically, the Burren was in fact a good place to fatten cattle on winter grass and, 
in these auditory representations of sexual intercourse and child birth, the 
condensation of bodies and ground announces and inaugurates a new beginning. 
 Perceived by Emmet as a change in his mother’s ‘mood’ (p. 292), the 
reclamation of primal ground takes the form of an affirmation. The perversion of 
hope, the unfounded but tenacious belief that ‘nothing happens’, gives way to the 
possible impossibility of the findable object. By the end of the novel, Rosaleen 
assumes the penances imposed on her: on the one hand, the astonishment with which 
she awoke ‘lasted a long time in her blood’ (p. 280); on the other, grass may be seen, 
finally, as a synonym for the ground on which life and death are admitted, although 
not as finished, separate states. An atonement of sorts follows in Rosaleen’s 
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penitential admission that, for the sake of the future, she should have ‘paid more 
attention to things’ (p. 310). 
 
Conclusion 
I have set out in this paper what seems to me a viable framework for a general theory 
of hope. While allowing for the clinical and cultural phenomenon of perverse hope – 
the omnipotent narcissistic fantasy that nothing will come of waiting even as one 
waits – at the same time, I have proposed a more positive evaluation of hope as the 
doing of a certain kind of action. My main conclusion is that, further to the devitalised 
illusions of self-destructive waiting, the hope that comes with the inaugural gift of 
love enacts a belief in the (inner) future. Taking Balint’s notions of ‘primary love’ and 
‘therapeutic regression’ as a starting point, I have linked the idea of a ‘new beginning’ 
– one that doesn’t cease to be one – with Winnicott’s account of the ‘moment of hope’ 
and of the destruction-survival of the object. Stoicism is not the only, or the most 
vital, option available to us; nor does resignation describe the whole of our attitude 
towards reality. I have identified defiance as a further option, with respect to the 
possibilities that present themselves in the gap between the underlying conviction that 
‘something is available’ and the unconscious assumption that ‘something is missing’ 
(lost or damaged). Defiance embodies hopeful waiting in terms of a possible new 
beginning (‘I begin here again’, Walcott, 1973, p. 145), without necessarily denying 
the terrible things that may have happened. This, I think, applies even to the worst that 
can happen, which doesn’t necessarily make a future impossible. Hope remains the 
enactment of its own possibility – ‘Each one demand and answer to his part / 
Performed in this wide gap of time…’ (Shakespeare, 1987b, p. 916). 
 
 25 
About the Author 
Steven Groarke is Professor of Social Thought at the University of Roehampton and a 
member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. He is the author, most recently, of 
Managed Lives: Psychoanalysis, Inner Security and the Social Order (Routledge, 
2014). He works in private practice in London. 
 
Acknowledgement 
I am grateful to Peter Redman, Simon Thomas and two anonymous reviewers for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
 
References 
Abram, J. (2008) The evolution of Winnicott’s theoretical matrix: A brief outline. In: J. 
Abram (ed.) Donald Winnicott Today. Hove: Routledge, pp. 73-112. 
Aulagnier, P. (2001) The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement. 
Translated by A. Sheridan. Hove: Routledge. 
Balint, M. (1930/1985) Psychosexual parallels to the fundamental law of biogenetics. In: 
Primary Love and Psycho-Analytic Technique. London: Maresfield, pp. 11-41. 
Balint, M. (1935/1985) The final goal of psycho-analytic treatment. In: Primary Love 
and Psycho-Analytic Technique. London: Maresfield, pp. 188-99. 
Balint, E. (1963/1993) On being empty of oneself. In: J. Mitchell and M.  
Parsons (eds.) Before I was I: Psychoanalysis and Imagination. London: Free  
Association Books, pp. 39-55. 
Balint, M. (1968/2003) The Basic Fault: Therapeutic Aspects of Regression. London: 
Brumner-Routledge. 
Bate, J. (2015) Ted Hughes: The Unauthorised Life. London: William Collins. 
 26 
Beckett, S. (1970/1984) Breath. In: Collected Shorter Plays. London: Faber and Faber, 
pp. 209-11. 
Beckett, S. (1983) Worstward Ho. London: John Calder. 
Bloch, E. (1995) The Principle of Hope. Vols. I-III. Translated by N. Plaice, S. Plaice, 
and P. Knight. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Boris, H. N. (1976) On hope: Its nature and psychotherapy. International Review of 
Psychoanalysis 3: 139-150. 
Derrida, J. (1967/1976) Of Grammatology. Translated by G. C. Spivak. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Derrida, J. (1968/1982) Ousia and Grammē: Note on a note from Being and Time. In: 
Margins of Philosophy. Translated by A. Bass. Brighton: Harvester Press, pp. 29-67. 
Derrida, J. (1971/1982) Signature event context. In: Margins of Philosophy. Translated 
by A. Bass. Brighton: Harvester Press, pp. 307-30. 
Derrida, J. (1992a). Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money. Translated by P. Kamuf. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Derrida, J. (1992b) Ulysses gramophone: Hear say yes in Joyce. In: D. Attridge (ed.) 
Acts of Literature. Translated by T. Kendall. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 
253-309. 
Derrida, J. (1998/2002) As if it were possible, ‘within such limits’ …. In: Negotiations: 
Interventions and Interviews 1971-2001. Translated by E. Rottenberg. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, pp. 343-70. 
Enright, A. (2015) The Green Road. London: Jonathan Cape. 
Enright, A. (2016) An acute observer with an outsider’s eye for detail. The Guardian 
Review, 26 November, p. 5. 
 27 
Freud, S. (1930/1961) Civilization and Its Discontents. Standard Edition 21. London: 
Hogarth Press, pp. 57-145. 
Freud, S. (1933 [1932]/1964) New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. Standard 
Edition 22. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 5-182. 
Green, A. (2005) Key Ideas for a Contemporary Psychoanalysis: Misrecognition and 
Recognition of the Unconscious. London and New York: Routledge. 
Henry, M. (1993) The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis. Translated by D. Brick. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Kafka, F. (1919/1978) Before the Law: In: Wedding Preparations in the Country and 
Other Stories. Translated by W. Muir and E. Muir. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, pp. 
127-29. 
Klein, M. (1952/1980) Some theoretical conclusions regarding the emotional life of the 
infant. In: Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 
61-93. 
Klein, M. (1957/1980) Envy and gratitude. In: Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 
1946-1963. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 176-235. 
Klein, M. (1963/1980) On the sense of loneliness. In: Envy and Gratitude and Other 
Works 1946-1963. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 300-13. 
Kohon, G. (2016) Reflections on the Aesthetic Experience. Hove: Routledge. 
Loewald, H. W. (1962/1980) Superego and time. In: Papers on Psycho-Analysis. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 43-52. 
Mitchell, S. (1993) Hope and Dread in Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. 
Ogden, T. H. (2016) Destruction reconceived: On Winnicott’s ‘The Use of an Object 
and Relating through Identifications’. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 97: 1243-
1262. 
 28 
Potamianou, A. (1997) Hope: A Shield in the Economy of Borderline States. Translated 
by P. Slotkin. London and New York: Routledge. 
Ricoeur, P. (1970) Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. Translated by D. 
Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Shakespeare, W. (1987a) Macbeth. In: S. Wells and G. Taylor (eds.) The Complete 
Oxford Shakespeare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shakespeare, W. (1987b) The Winter’s Tale. In: S. Wells and G. Taylor (eds.) The 
Complete Oxford Shakespeare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sillitoe, A. (1959/2007) The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runner. London: Harper 
Collins. 
Steiner, J. (1993) Psychic Retreats: Pathological Organizations in Psychotic, Neurotic 
and Borderline Patients. London and New York: Routledge. 
Stevens, W. (1955) Collected Poems. London: Faber and Faber. 
Taylor, C. (2007) A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Thompson, E. P. (1993) Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Walcott, D. (1992) Collected Poems 1948-1984. London: Faber and Faber. 
Weber, M. (1930) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by T. 
Parsons. London: Unwin University Books. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1952/1978) Anxiety associated with insecurity. In: Through 
Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 97-100. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1954/1978) Metapsychological and clinical aspects of regression 
within the psycho-analytical set-up. In: Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis. 
London: Hogarth Press, pp. 278-94. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1954-5/1978) The depressive position in normal emotional  
 29 
development. In: Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis. London: Hogarth Press,  
pp. 262-77. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1956/1984) The antisocial tendency. In: C. Winnicott, R. Shepherd  
and M. Davis (eds.) Deprivation and Delinquency. London and New York: Tavistock 
Publications, pp. 120-31. 
Winnicott, D.W. (1960/1985) Ego distortion in terms of true and false self. In: The 
Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 
140-52. 
Winnicott, D.W. (1963a/1985) Morals and education. In: The Maturational Processes 
and the Facilitating Environment. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 93-105. 
Winnicott, D.W. (1963b/1985) Communicating and not communicating leading to a 
study of certain opposites. In: The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating 
Environment. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 179-92. 
Winnicott, D.W. (1963c/1986) The value of depression. In: Home Is Where We Start 
From. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, pp. 71-79. 
Winnicott, D.W. (1965) A clinical study of the effect of a failure of the average 
expectable environment on a child’s mental functioning. International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis 46: 81-87. 
Winnicott, D.W. (1971/1974) The use of an object and relating through identifications. 
In: Playing and Reality. London: Tavistock Publications, pp. 86-94. 
Wordsworth, W. (1799/2014) Wordsworth’s Poetry and Prose. Selected and edited by 
N. Halmi. New York: W. W. Norton. 
